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In July 2018 the Law Commission published a Consultation Paper on proposed 
reforms to the United Kingdom (UK) suspicious activity reporting (SARs) regimes 
relating to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorism Financing 
(CTF). This article argues that, notwithstanding the proposed retention of an 
“all-crimes” approach to AML, the SARs regime may still be streamlined by way 
of the proposed amendments to the scope of reporting. The proposals to elevate 
the thresholds for reporting suspicions of money laundering, whilst conceptually 
appealing, present operational challenges for those within the reporting sectors. 
 
Introduction 
Money laundering, where criminal proceeds are processed “to disguise their illegal 
origin”, and terrorism financing are both issues which have dominated the 
international agenda in recent decades.1 That this should be the case is unsurprising 
given the sheer economic scale attributed to the former (2.7 per cent of global 
GDP) and the devastating human cost occasioned by the latter.2 In the UK alone, 
the National Crime Agency (NCA) note there is a “realistic possibility” that annual 
money laundering impacting on the UK could be “hundreds of billions” of pounds.3   
The transnational response has been spearheaded by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) which acts as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and 
counter-terrorism finance (CTF) standard setter. Evolving recommendations issued 
by FATF over the years have cascaded down via a series of EU Directives and 
converged to form a comprehensive AML and CTF framework at a national UK 
level.4 That national framework is subject to the peer review process conducted 
 
* Many thanks to Professor Nicholas Ryder. 
1 FATF, “Frequently Asked Questions: Money Laundering” (FATF), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/faq 
/moneylaundering [Accessed 20 July 2018]. 
2 The amount of money available for laundering via the financial system is estimated by UNODC to be 2.7 per 
cent of global GDP or US$1.6 trillion; see UNODC, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting From Drug Trafficking 
and Other Transnational Organized Crimes (UNODC, 2011), p.7. 
3 NCA, Annual Plan 2018-9 (NCA), p.6. 
4 FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and The Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation 




by FATF known as mutual evaluation, the latest results of which are due to be 
published at the end of 2018/early 2019. 
AML and CTF measures have long been characterised conceptually as falling 
into two categories: prevention and enforcement.5 The obligation to report 
suspicions of money laundering or terrorism financing (known as suspicious activity 
reports or SARs) is a key aspect of the prevention “pillar” on which the AML/CTF 
framework rests.6 Such reports may well provide the evidential basis underpinning 
or enhancing AML/CTF investigations and asset confiscations. Any such framework 
must therefore take into account a trinity of interests of: (i) those making SARs, 
(ii) law enforcement agencies, and (iii) those in respect of whom SARs are made. 
Any comprehensive AML/CTF framework must also look to meaningful 
enforcement of that regime. 
In the UK, the NCA report a continuing upward trajectory in the number of 
SARs submitted (634,113 from October 2015–March 2017), a volume of reporting 
which dwarfs levels seen in jurisdictions which the Commission puts forward as 
comparators in terms of the size of their financial sectors (Switzerland—2,909 
SARs in 2016) or economy (France—64,815 reports in 2016).7 Whilst such 
“headline” figures may be broadly illustrative, they must also be treated with some 
caution—for example FATF’s evaluation of Switzerland’s AML/CTF measures in 
2016 reported that “insufficient” reports were being made.8 
Whilst the intelligence potential and capacity to disrupt criminality is 
incalculable, the abundance of UK SARs does not track through to a plentiful 
harvest in terms of asset recovery.9 What it does do, however, is result in 
considerable resources being deployed both by those making reports, and for the 
NCA who receive and analyse them. Hence an enduring disquiet has arisen amongst 
the reporting community that the regime, despite what Ryder calls its “laudable 
aims”, is hampered by a number of issues ranging in scale and scope which affect 
its efficiency and proportionality.10 Practical issues include the high volume of 
SARs, some of which are submitted defensively to avoid criminal liability, and 
many of which are of little intelligence value and/or are of poor quality.11 A cocktail 
of legal factors also intermingle to impact negatively upon the operation of the 
regime, namely: (i) an “all-crimes” approach to AML with no de minimis, (ii) the 
low threshold of “suspicion” which triggers reporting under the regimes, and (iii) 
 
 
of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation 
648/2012 and repealing Directive 2005/60 and Commission Directive 2006/70 [2015] OJ L141/73 (4AMLD). 4AMLD 
is transposed into national law by way of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds 
(Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/692). See also Criminal Finances Act 2017 for additional AML 
measures. 
5 M. Levi and P. Reuter, “Money Laundering” (2006) 34 Crime & Just. 289, 297. 
6 Other prevention measures include customer due diligence, regulation/supervision and administrative/regulatory 
sanctions: see Levi and Reuter, “Money Laundering” (2006) 34 Crime & Just. 289, 297. 
7 NCA, Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2017 (NCA), figs iii–iv, p.7; fig.i, p.6. The total number 
of SARs lodged in 2016 in Switzerland was 2,909, MROS, Annual Report 2017 (MROS, 2018), p.9. In France, the 
figure for 2016 was 64,815, Tracfin, Tracfin Annual Report 2016, (Tracfin), p.8. 
8 FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures Switzerland Mutual Evaluation Report 
December 2016 (FATF, 2016), p.4. 
9 Restrained sums and cash seizures arising from refused DAML requests between October 2015 and March 2017 
total £35,893,941 and £16,183,553 respectively. HMRC indemnified £51,039 and recovered £1,784,845. NCA, 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2017 (NCA), fig.v, p.8. 
10 N. Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century, (Edward Elgar, 2011), p.30. 





the individual criminal sanctions surrounding the regime, a feature which Campbell 
notes fosters “over-recording and over-reporting”.12 
The “repeated criticism” of the SARs regime is evident from the UK’s first 
National Risk Assessment in 2015, which fed into proposals for SARs reform in 
the Government’s AML Action Plan in 2016 where it was acknowledged that 
“radical changes” to the regime were required.13 The Law Commission review 
complements the joint NCA/Home Office SARs Reform Programme and broader 
Treasury Committee Economic Crime inquiry into AML.14 It considers the issues 
with, and potential reform of, the suspicious activity reporting regimes (and in 
particular the consent regime detailed below), with the overarching purpose of 
improving the UK’s “prevention, detection and prosecution” of money laundering 
and terrorism financing.15 This is a particularly challenging task given that the 
Commission is constrained from the outset by a number of factors, namely the 
boundaries of pre-existing legislative structures, the requirements of EU directives 
pre-Brexit, and the recommendations of FATF.16 
The position surrounding Brexit is nuanced. Whilst the UK will no longer be 
subject to EU AML directives post-Brexit, continued harmonisation with EU 
measures is assumed by the Commission.17 In any event, the UK will remain a 
member of FATF and therefore seek to comply with the FATF Recommendations 
which themselves sit behind and drive the EU framework. Even within these 
parameters, there is scope for the UK to alter its AML offering, as will be seen in 
the remainder of this article, given that the starting point for the UK is that it has 
gone further than the FATF or EU requirements to date. 
This article sets out briefly the mechanics of the reporting regimes under review. 
Thereafter the article focusses upon two key aspects of the SARs regime explored 
by the Consultation Paper: (i) the “all-crimes”/“serious crimes” approach to AML, 
and (ii) the proposals with regard to the current suspicion thresholds across the 
regimes. Whilst the Consultation Paper explores additional aspects of the regime, 
such as enhanced information sharing and corporate criminal liability, these topics 
are outside the scope of this article. 
 
Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Regime—Proceeds of Crime 
Act (POCA) 2002 Pt 7 
The suspicious activity reporting regime (SARs Regime) in an AML context refers 
to the “end-to-end system by which industry spots suspicious activity related to 
money laundering … and reports this” to the UK’s financial intelligence unit (FIU) 
 
12 Law Commission, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARs Regime Consultation Paper, para.4.16. The Consultation 
Paper also highlights confusion by reporters with regard to their obligations, and uncertainties surrounding the concept 
of “suspicion” as drivers behind high reporting volumes; L. Campbell, “Dirty cash (money talks): 4AMLD and the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2017” [2018] Crim.L.R. 102, 107. 
13 HM Treasury and Home Office, UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing (HM 
Treasury and Home Office,2015), p.6; Home Office and HM Treasury, Action Plan for anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorist finance (HM Treasury and Home Office, 2016), pp.12–15 and Annex B. 
14 NCA, Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2017, p.30; UK Parliament, “Treasury Committee 
Economic Crime inquiry” (UK Parliament, 2018), https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z 
/commons-select/treasury-committee/inquiries1/parliament-2017/economic-crime-17-19/ [Accessed 23 August 2018]. 
15 Law Commission, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARs Regime Consultation Paper, para.1.28. 
16 See Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 which makes provision “for the purposes of implementing 
Standards published by the Financial Action Task Force”. 




within the NCA.18 Upon submission, SARs are added to the NCA database, mined 
for useful intelligence, and disseminated to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to 
assist with money laundering investigations.19 The regime is comprised of two 
complementary but distinct strands—“authorised disclosures” and “required 
disclosures”. 
Under the first strand, should a person deal or propose to deal in some manner 
with criminal property, which is criminalised under the substantive money 
laundering offences set out in POCA 2002 ss.327–329, a SAR may be made by 
way of “authorised disclosure” under POCA 2002 s.338.20 This situation may arise, 
for example, where a banker, accountant or lawyer encounters underlying criminal 
property as part of their customer services or client retainer. NCA consent (either 
actual consent or deemed consent) may then be obtained to continue with the 
transaction, depending on the timing of the SAR.21 Such disclosure and consent 
provisions are known as the “consent regime”. Deemed consent will apply either on 
the expiry of the notice period of seven working days if no refusal has been 
received from the NCA, or, if a refusal has been received, on the expiry of the 
relevant moratorium period.22 These time periods provide a transactional hiatus 
during which the NCA/law enforcement may determine what AML action to take.           
The Criminal Finances Act 2017 made a number of changes to the regime. It 
incorporated provisions into POCA 2002 whereby a court may order an extended 
moratorium period of up to a further 186 days.23 It also inserted voluntary 
information sharing provisions which, when fully implemented, will permit 
disclosures between members of the regulated sector and joint disclosures (“Super 
SARs”) to the NCA.24 Further information orders were also imported into the Act 
enabling the NCA to seek supplementary information from those reporting to it 
or businesses in the regulated sector.25 
Such authorised disclosures (and any “appropriate consent”) act as a complete 
exemption from the substantive money laundering offences set out in ss.327–329 
of the Act.26 The rationale behind the consent regime therefore is that it provides 
potentially useful intelligence, and the opportunity for intervention, whilst 
simultaneously shielding reporters from criminal liability for a substantive money 
laundering offence.27 Keen to avoid any perception that the NCA are, in effect, 
legitimising illicit funds by providing consent to a transaction, such disclosures 
were rebranded by the NCA as DAML SARs (defence against money laundering) 
in June 2016.28 
 
 
18 NCA, “The SARs Regime” (NCA), http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic 
-crime/ukfiu/the-sars-regime [Accessed 23 August 2018]. 
19 NCA, “The SARs Regime” (NCA), http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic 
-crime/ukfiu/the-sars-regime [Accessed 23 August 2018]. 
20 Authorised disclosures are made to a constable, customs officer or nominated officer under POCA 2002 s.338(1)(a). 
21 For actual and deemed appropriate consent provisions see POCA 2002 ss.335 and 336. 
22 See POCA 2002 s.335(2)–(7) and s.336(3)–(9). Deemed consent will apply where no refusal has been received 
before the end of the notice period of seven working days (starting from the first working day post disclosure). Deemed 
consent provisions also apply where a refusal has been received within the notice period and the moratorium period 
expires. The initial moratorium period is 31 days commencing on the date refusal is received. 
23 POCA 2002 ss.335(6A), 336(8A), 336A–336D. Inserted by Criminal Finances Act 2017 s.10. 
24 POCA 2002 ss.339ZB–339ZG inserted by Criminal Finances Act 2017 s.11. 
25 POCA 2002 s.339ZH inserted by Criminal Finances Act 2017 s.12. 
26 POCA 2002 ss.327(2)(a), 328(2)(a) and 329(2)(a). 
27 Home Office, Home Office Circular 029/2008 (2008), para.4. 
28 NCA, Requesting a defence from the NCA under POCA and TACT (NCA, 2016). 
  
 
The second strand of the reporting regime, backed by criminal sanctions, provides 
for “required disclosures”.29 The “failure to disclose” offence set out in POCA 
2002 s.330 requires those in the regulated sector (such as bankers, lawyers or 
accountants) to report their knowledge or suspicions of money laundering activity 
by another to their nominated officer (the Money Laundering Reporting Officer) 
or the NCA.30 The information on which the report is based must come to the 
person in the course of business, and must be made to the MLRO “as soon as is 
practicable”.31 An objective standard also applies in this section, imposing a 
requirement to report where there are “reasonable grounds for knowing or 
suspecting” someone is money laundering.32 Comparable provisions applicable to 
the MLRO in receipt of an internal SAR are set out in s.331.33 The objective 
negligence based threshold in s.330/331 has been justified on the basis that higher 
standards of AML diligence are expected within the regulated sector.34 
Simultaneously however, Goldby contends that the objective test constitutes “a 
stick to threaten those who may be inclined not to take their legal obligation to 
report sufficiently seriously”.35 
“Tipping Off” provisions also apply under the regime. An offence is committed 
if a person reveals the fact that a SAR has been made (using information obtained 
in the course of a business in the regulated sector), and such action is “likely to 
prejudice any investigation that might be conducted following the disclosure”.36 
An offence is also committed if a person reveals that an investigation into 
allegations that a money laundering offence has been committed is being 
“contemplated or is being carried out”, if that revelation is also “likely to prejudice 
that investigation”.37 
 
Counter-Terrorism Financing Reporting Regime—Terrorism 
Act (TACT) 2000 Pt 3 
The UK AML regime operates in tandem with its CTF regime, despite the differing 
quantitative and qualitative indicia of terrorism. For example, terrorism financing 
may be characterised by different motivations other than concealing illicit funds 
or maximising profits, involve modest amounts, and constitute “reverse” laundering 
where clean funds are used to fund terrorist acts.38 As with the AML regime, the 
CTF reporting regime encompasses both “prior consent” and “required” disclosures. 
 
 
29 See POCA 2002 s.334 for applicable criminal sanctions. 
30 POCA 2002 s.330(2)(a). For the regulated sector see POCA 2002 Sch.9. 
31 POCA 2002 s.330(3) and (4). Reporters must be able to identify the launderer or the location of the laundered 
property (or they believe, or it is reasonable to expect them to believe, that the information will or may assist in this 
regard), POCA 2002 s.330(3A). 
32 POCA 2002 s.330(2)(b). 
33 POCA 2002 s.332 creates a failure to disclose offence with regard to disclosures made to a nominated officer 
outside the regulated sector. 
34 Secretary of State, Proceeds of Crime Bill Publication of Draft Clauses (2001), Cm.5066, Pt VIII, para.8.6. 
35 M. Goldby, “Anti-money laundering reporting requirements imposed by English law: measuring effectiveness 
and gauging the need for reform” [2013] J.B.L. 367, 371. 
36 POCA 2002 s.333A(1) and (2). On summary conviction the maximum prison term is three months and/or a fine. 
In the Crown Court, the maximum penalty for tipping off is two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine, POCA 2002 
s.333A(4). 
37 POCA 2002 s.333A(3). 
38 For comments on reverse laundering see S.D. Cassella, “Reverse Money Laundering” (2003) 7(1) J.M.L.C. 92; 
see also P. Sproat, “Counter-Terrorist Finance in the UK: a Quantitative and Qualitative Commentary based on 




A person may gain exemption from the terrorism financing offences set out in 
TACT 2000 ss.15-18 via the prior consent route. Prior to becoming involved in a 
transaction or arrangement, reporters disclose to the NCA (who consult with the 
National Terrorism Financial Intelligence Unit (NTFIU)) their suspicion or belief 
that terrorist property is involved and receive actual or deemed consent to proceed 
(such disclosure known as a “Defence Against Terrorism Financing SAR” or 
“DATF SAR”).39 The same notice period applies to the deemed consent provisions 
as for POCA 2002—seven working days starting with the first working day post-
SAR —but there is no moratorium period.40 Similar failure to disclose and tipping 
off offences apply under this framework.41 Whilst high volumes of reporting are not 
the issue in this arena, the NTFIU have also expressed concern over poor-quality 
SARs of little intelligence value.42 
The preceding paragraphs set out the key features of the AML/CTF reporting 
regimes. It is against this legislative backdrop that the article considers one of the 
central aspects of the SARs regime explored by the Commission—the “all-crimes” 
approach to AML. 
 
The “All-Crimes” Approach in POCA 2002 
One of the drivers behind the current turgidity of the SARs regime is the UK’s 
adoption of an “all-crimes” approach to AML. The substantive money laundering 
offences set out in POCA 2002 ss.327–329 criminalise dealings with “criminal 
property”, a definition widely cast to encompass property relating to all crimes.43 
Naturally this design feature of the regime has a consequential effect on the levels 
of both authorised and required disclosures. In adopting this policy the UK goes 
further than the FATF Recommendations, which envisage the criminalisation of 
money laundering relating to serious crimes (albeit “with a view to including the 
widest range of predicate offences”).44 It also goes further than the requirements 
of 4AMLD, which restricts predicate offences to serious crimes identified both by 
way of a list of specified offences and in addition by reference to length of 
maximum sentence.45 
The adoption of this “leave no stone unturned” approach has the advantage that 
front-line reporters such as bank staff are not required to make any assessment as 
to the seriousness or otherwise of any underlying offence.46 This is of considerable 
assistance to those reporters outside of the legal sector such as banks, which 
constitute the largest reporting sector by far, submitting 82.85 per cent of SARs 
 
 
39 TACT 2000 ss.21ZA and 15–18. 
40 TACT 2000 s.21ZA(2)–(3). 
41 TACT 2000 s.21A; see also s.19; for tipping off provisions see TACT 2000 s.21(D)–(H). 
42 Law Commission, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARs Regime Consultation Paper, paras 3.33–3.35. 
43 POCA 2002 s.340(3) provides that “Property is criminal property if (a) it constitutes a person’s benefit from 
criminal conduct or it represents such a benefit (in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly), and (b) the alleged 
offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit.” A deposit-taking institution may avail 
itself of a de minimis threshold of £250 (s.339A) pursuant to ss.327(2C), 328(5) and 329(2C). 
44 FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and The Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation 
-The FATF Recommendations, Recommendations 3 and 5. 
45 4AMLD art.3(4). 
46 R. Stokes and A. Arora, “The duty to report under the money laundering legislation within the United Kingdom” 
[2004] J.B.L. 332, 355; See also Secretary of State for the Home Department, Money Laundering and the Financing 
of Terrorism: the Government Reply to the nineteenth Report from the House of Lords European Union Committee 




between October 2015 and March 2017.47 It also has the concomitant potential 
advantage of maximising the intelligence available to the authorities via disclosures 
made to it, and the concrete advantage that prosecutors are not required to identify 
specific predicate offences. Hence the Law Commission is of the view that moving 
to a “serious crimes” approach to AML is both “problematic and undesirable”.48 
One of the disadvantages of the all-crimes approach, however, can be seen with 
regard to specific sectors, and this can be illustrated neatly by reference to the legal 
profession. Minor offences and regulatory breaches carrying criminal sanctions 
(which may be conceived of as “technical” breaches) may come to light in the 
course of a retainer. Such technical breaches, examples of which are the breach 
of a tree preservation order or failure to obtain an asbestos survey, will trigger 
reporting requirements, a process made more challenging by the requirement to 
identify any notional saving or benefit from the breach under the Act.49 It is these 
“technical” reporting requirements, offering little by way of valuable intelligence, 
which may have a corrosive effect on confidence in and compliance with the 
regime for the legal sector.50 Reporters in the banking sector, in contrast, would 
rarely, if ever, encounter such minor offences or regulatory breaches on the basis 
that their customer interaction is primarily focussed on the movement of funds. 
Notwithstanding the Commission’s stance on the issue, consultees’ views are 
sought as to whether the UK should adopt a serious crimes approach to the money 
laundering offences, either by reference to a list of specified offences or those 
offences carrying maximum penalties of more than a year’s imprisonment.51 
Doubtless there are mechanical challenges to be overcome should this approach 
be adopted, such as formulating and updating the inclusion criteria in relation to 
any list of specified offences, and ensuring that any threshold penalty does not 
trade simplicity for arbitrariness.52 These challenges are not insurmountable 
however, and it is worth noting at this juncture that 4AMLD combines both these 
approaches with regard to predicate crimes, an approach which has been adopted 
in other EU jurisdictions such as Germany, and which could provide an appropriate 
starting point for the UK.53 Any move to a serious crimes approach would certainly 
streamline the SARs regime, but also presents additional operational challenges 
when making a SAR for reporters determining whether an offence is serious or 
not, and challenges for prosecutors if required to link particular proceeds to 
particular predicates. 
The Commission is also consulting on other permutations spanning the all-
crimes/serious crimes divide. An alternative option is the retention of an “all-
crimes” approach to the substantive offences, the advantage of which is that it 
would maximise the options available to prosecutors, whilst utilising a serious 
crimes approach to disclosures. Again, the challenge here is for those reporters, 
 
 
47 NCA, Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2017, fig.xii, p.12. 
48 Law Commission, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARs Regime Consultation Paper, para.5.17. 
49 S. Kebbell, “‘Everybody’s looking at nothing’ – the legal profession and the disproportionate burden of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002” [2017] Crim. L.R. 741. 
50 Kebbell, “‘Everybody’s looking at nothing’ – the legal profession and the disproportionate burden of the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002” [2017] Crim. L.R. 741, 752. 
51 Law Commission, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARs Regime Consultation Paper, para.5.9. For such a list see 
for example POCA 2002 Sch.2 and Serious Crime Act 2007 Sch.1. 
52 Law Commission, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARs Regime Consultation Paper, para.5.13. 




particularly outside of the legal sector, required to make a determination as to the 
seriousness of any predicate crime. 
One further option envisages the implementation of a voluntary pathway for 
the regulated sector to flag up non-serious matters to the NCA, whilst requiring 
disclosures in respect of serious offences. This option may be of benefit to legal 
sector reporters, certainly the adoption of a “tiered” reporting system was one of 
the embryonic options previously considered by the Law Society whereby reporters 
would simply “grade the importance of the SARs they submit”.54 
 
The extension of a de minimis threshold? 
The all-crimes approach encompasses criminal property of any value, the effect 
of which is to generate SARs which are of no utility in terms of asset seizure, either 
because the sums involved are too inconsequential to pursue, or because they fall 
below the seizure threshold of £1,000 provided for in POCA 2002.55 Incorporating 
a de minimis reporting threshold would automatically decrease the volume of such 
SARs and is therefore considered as part of the Commission’s review. This is 
already a familiar concept in POCA 2002 in that deposit-taking institutions may 
avail themselves of an exemption to the substantive offences in respect of the 
operation of customer accounts below a specified threshold.56 Such a threshold 
would lead to fewer SARs being lodged, however the Commission is opposed to 
the insertion of a de minimis threshold across other parts of the regulated sector. 
Whilst any threshold carries with it the risk that offenders will simply structure 
around it, the most persuasive justification for this stance is that it may prompt a 
decline in terrorism-related intelligence given the small monetary amounts that 
may be involved in terrorism-related activities. Certainly from a reporter’s 
perspective there may be significant blurring between the AML and CTF 
regimes—some form of criminal activity may be suspected and an AML SAR 
submitted without necessarily making any conscious links with terrorism, with 
such “crossover” SARs providing useful CTF intelligence. An additional issue is 
that any de minimis threshold with regard to required disclosures would also 
conflict with the UK’s current obligations under art.33 of 4AMLD requiring reports 
to a member state’s FIU “regardless of the amount involved”.57 
 
Amendments to the Scope of Reporting 
Retaining an “all crimes of any value” approach to reporting will, in the absence 
of further intervention, do nothing to assist with streamlining the SARs regime. 
So how to deal with those SARs which are recognised as “taking valuable resources 
to investigate”, but which are simultaneously of “little intelligence value”?58 The 
Commission provisionally proposes that, in preference to the constraints inherent 
 
54 The Law Society, Response of the Law Society of England and Wales to the consultation issued by the Home 
Office and HM Treasury on the Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance - legislative 
proposals (The Law Society, June 2016), p.4. 
55 POCA 2002 s.294(3). Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Recovery of Cash in Summary Proceedings: Minimum 
Amount) Order 2006 (SI 2006/1699). 
56 POCA 2002 ss.327(2C), 328(5) and 329(2C). The current threshold is £250. 
57 See also Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, FATF, International Standards on Combating Money 
Laundering and The Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation - The FATF Recommendations. 
58 Law Commission, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARs Regime Consultation Paper, para.11.1. 
  
 
in legislative amendment, SARs of limited intelligence value could be excluded 
from the regime by way of the “reasonable excuse” exemption for non-disclosure 
which would be supported by evolving statutory guidance.59 The “reasonable 
excuse” exemption is a provision of POCA 2002 as yet untested in the courts, and 
currently attracts differing interpretations across sector-specific guidance.60 
The challenge of SARs reform is, according to Donald Toon (Director of 
Prosperity within the NCA), “how we lose that which has no value without throwing 
the baby out with the bathwater”.61 Any reduction in the scope of the reporting 
regime must therefore balance a reduction in the number of SARs submitted whilst 
retaining those SARs which are of use.62 To this end, the Consultation Paper 
incorporates a practical and pragmatic exploration of those SARs which could 
potentially be excluded following stakeholder consultation, a number of which 
are detailed below. 
 
The banking sector—mixed funds in bank accounts 
One such proposal will assist banks in relation to the conundrum posed by mixed 
legitimate and illicit funds in a bank account. The issue of fungibility (money being 
substitutable) and legal precedent (Causey, N v RBS) result in a legal position 
where: (i) mixed funds in an account are indistinguishable and therefore 
unidentifiable, and (ii) the entire account is then tainted.63 Many banks will therefore 
freeze entire accounts rather than ring-fence suspected criminal property (thus 
preserving the funds available for restraint), the consequences of which may be 
severe for the subjects of disclosures. The Commission therefore proposes amending 
ss.327–329 so that, using an approach which is more akin to that deployed in 
relation to mixed funds within the civil recovery provisions of POCA 2002, banks 
should be allowed to transfer the equivalent value of suspected funds into a separate 
account (or ring-fence suspected funds within an account) without committing a 
substantive money laundering offence, with the intelligence flow to the NCA being 
preserved by way of required disclosures. The challenge here for the banks is in 
actually being able to identify which funds are clean and which funds are illicit, a 
challenge exacerbated in respect of pooled client accounts. An additional proposal 
by the Commission, which will also assist the banking sector in streamlining their 
reporting, is by permitting a single SAR with regard to multiple transactions on 
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Further carve-outs from the scope of reporting 
The Commission presents a range of other scenarios to which the reasonable excuse 
exemption could be appropriately applied. These are designed to remove the 
necessity for a SAR where: (i) a transaction has no UK nexus, (ii) to avoid duplicate 
reporting to multiple LEAs, or (iii) where the only suspicion is attributable to 
enquiries from an LEA.65 Defining the parameters is the challenge presented by 
those SARs relating to historical crime, or information in the public domain, and 
for that reason the Commission proposes a shortened form of SAR to apply to the 
latter. Further, the Commission proposes that only required disclosures should be 
necessary in respect of property purchases in the UK on the basis that such property 
is immoveable.66 Careful consideration must be given to this particular carve out 
however, on the basis that any property held by a corporate entity is liable to a 
disposition by way of share sale, in which case the transactional hiatus afforded 
by the consent regime may be extremely useful. 
In summary, the Commission has engaged in a comprehensive review of those 
SARs which pose practical challenges across all reporting sectors. It is to be hoped 
that those minor offences and regulatory breaches which are of particular concern 
to legal sector reporters and of no interest to the NCA may also be dealt with using 
the reasonable excuse exemption. This on the basis that there are key distinctions 
to be drawn between all crimes, serious crimes and minor offences. 
Having considered the options with regard to the all crimes/serious crimes 
approach to AML, and the potential SARs that may be brought outside of the scope 
of the reporting regime, this article now considers the “pivotal concept” of suspicion 
within POCA 2002, and the proposals made in respect of it.67 
 
Suspicion 
The concept of suspicion is interlaced throughout POCA 2002, yet at the same 
time is a concept which “nimbly defies precise identification in practical terms”.68 
It has also nimbly eluded any definition within POCA 2002, TACT 2000, the 
FATF Recommendations or 4AMLD. The substantive money laundering offences 
criminalise dealings with criminal property where the alleged offender knows or 
suspects that this is the case, which is a lower threshold than the knowledge and 
intent requirements made explicit in 4AMLD and implicit within the FATF 
Recommendations.69 In addition, ss.330/331 of the Act require disclosures where 
a person knows, suspects or has reasonable grounds to know or suspect that another 
is engaged in money laundering, provisions which are consonant with both 4AMLD 
and the FATF Recommendations.70 Yet despite its pervasive nature within the 
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reporting framework, the Commission notes that the concept remains “ill-defined, 
unclear and inconsistently applied”.71 
The lodestar in terms of judicial guidance on the concept is set out by Longmore 
LJ in the Court of Appeal case of Da Silva which provides that “suspicion” is a 
purely subjective concept meaning “a possibility, which is more than fanciful, that 
the relevant facts exist. A vague feeling of unease would not suffice”.72 In addition, 
Longmore LJ noted that there was no requirement within the statute for suspicion 
to be “clear” or “firmly grounded and targeted on specific facts”.73 The Court of 
Appeal resisted strenuously the argument to include any “reasonable grounds” 
concept to “suspicion” when invited to do so by the appellant’s counsel, 
commenting that to do so “would be to make a material change in the statutory 
provision for which there is no warrant”.74 Where appropriate, however, the jury 
should be directed that the suspicion should be of a “settled nature”.75 Such a low 
threshold for reporting has resulted in high-volume/poor-quality SARs being 
submitted, and inconsistencies in both the application of the concept, and guidance 
in respect of it, across sectors.76 
Defensive reporting has also become an intrinsic feature of the regime, 
understandably so, with a few hours spent submitting a SAR being infinitely 
preferable to the prospect of more than a few years’ incarceration for a substantive 
laundering or failure to disclose offence.77 The failure to disclose offences under 
ss.330/331 are also broad in scope, perpetuating defensive reporting as a 
consequence.78 The “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that another is laundering 
which will trigger a reporting obligation has been interpreted as an entirely objective 
test in the limited (albeit first instance) decisions within the jurisdiction.79 Lord 
Hughes, in the Supreme Court decision Sally Lane and John Letts, also confirmed 
that this interpretation would be applied in respect of the failure to disclose offence 
in TACT 2000 s.21A.80 Nor (on the limited authority available in Ahmad v HM 
Advocate) does it appear that there is any requirement that money laundering is 
actually taking place.81 
 
Reporting thresholds for required disclosures 
In order to address the expansive scope of reporting created by the low reporting 
thresholds within POCA 2002, the Commission proposes amending the reporting 
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threshold in ss. 330-1 (and also s.332) from suspicion to “reasonable grounds to 
suspect”. Rather than this constituting a purely objective test, as is currently the 
case under ss.330/331, it is proposed that a cumulative test will be deployed as 
interpreted by the House of Lords in Saik (although this approach is not guaranteed 
without statutory intervention).82 This would require both subjective suspicion on 
the part of a reporter, supported by objective grounds for that suspicion, a test 
frequently deployed in investigative contexts.83 It is suggested by the Commission 
that this revised threshold will foster a decline in defensive SARs of minimal 
intelligence value, particularly if supported by statutory guidance as proposed by 
the Commission and discussed below.84 Whilst a raised threshold may be 
conceptually appealing with regard to the point at which criminal liability for 
reporters bites, the challenge here is an operational one—it adds in what the 
Commission acknowledges may be “a layer of unnecessary complexity” for reporters 
required to delineate reasonable grounds, albeit one which the Commission 
envisages would be mitigated with appropriate AML training and guidance.85 A 
raised threshold also reduces the number of potential “crossover” SARs, i.e. those 
SARs submitted under POCA 2002 but which are of use in the CTF sphere. 
Compliance with the FATF Recommendations is also an issue here, given that 
Recommendation 20 provides for SARs where a 
“financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds 
are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing”, 
thus drawing a distinction between the two concepts.86 The Commission points to 
the recent mutual evaluation of Canada in 2016, whose reporting threshold is set 
at “reasonable grounds to suspect” and note that, whilst assessed as partially 
compliant, no issue was explicitly raised by FATF with regard to this trigger point, 
which is a curious argument to raise for potential non-compliance.87Article 33(1)(a) 
of 4AMLD also requires SARs to be made where an obliged entity “knows, suspects 
or has reasonable grounds to suspect” money laundering or terrorist financing and 
so raising the threshold would be non-compliant with 4AMLD. 
No adjustments are proposed with regard to the terrorism financing reporting 
thresholds on the basis that a low threshold is commensurate with the level of harm 
terrorism unleashes across society, and because the CTF regime has not resulted 
in the same reporting issues as those seen with AML SARs.88 This does mean that 
reporters would be using a lower threshold within the CTF arena than for AML, 
and so the question arises as to what operational challenges this may present when 
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Thresholds within the substantive offences 
The Commission proposes retaining suspicion as the trigger for criminality under 
the substantive money laundering offences on the basis that this enhances the 
ability of prosecutors to secure money laundering convictions and reflects the 
Parliamentary design of the offences.89 Without further intervention, the 
combination of an all-crimes approach in POCA 2002, together with a suspicion-
based threshold for criminality would do nothing to ameliorate the operation of 
the authorised disclosure and consent provisions. It may be recalled that such 
DAML SARs seeking consent to continue with a transaction are the most resource 
intensive both for reporters and the NCA. For those in respect of whom a 
disclosure is made, bereft of any funds whilst consent is awaited, and denied any 
explanation due to the spectre of “tipping off”, a DAML SAR may have catastrophic 
financial and reputational consequences.90 
Therefore, in response, the Commission proposes, inserting an exemption within 
ss.327–329 for reporters in the regulated sector who do not have reasonable grounds 
to suspect that property is criminal property (although they may still have a 
subjective suspicion).91 It is envisaged that, as with the failure to disclose offences 
in ss.330–332, the cumulative subjective/objective interpretation of the term 
“reasonable grounds to suspect” deployed in Saik will also be used within ss.327–
329. The Commission anticipates that this threshold may refine the quality and 
utility of DAML SARs for the NCA whilst introducing an additional layer of 
protection for the subjects of disclosures.92 As for required disclosures, effectively 
raising the threshold for criminal liability across the regulated sector in relation to 
the substantive offences is conceptually appealing, although it brings with it 
operational challenges in implementation. 
 
Measures supporting the proposed thresholds 
In support of these measures the Commission invites consultees’ views as to 
whether the Government should be required to issue statutory guidance on both 
the suspicion threshold and “reasonable grounds for suspicion” in respect of any 
revised threshold, together with a prescribed SARs form which would necessitate 
the delineation of a reporter’s grounds for suspicion.93 Whilst a flexible “single 
source of definitive guidance” may assist in addressing both sectoral inconsistencies 
in interpretation and any confusion surrounding the law (as opposed to what 
constitutes best practice), it must also be nuanced enough to take into account the 
very different encounters with potential laundering each sector faces.94 
The Commission envisages a non-exhaustive list of “those factors capable of 
founding a suspicion … and those which should be excluded” (with a similar list 
in respect of any “reasonable grounds for suspicion”).95 The potential drawback of 
any such list is that it may prompt a shift towards a more compliance focussed, 
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The Consultation Paper represents a thorough and comprehensive exploration of 
the issues surrounding the SARs Regime and proposals for reform. This is no mean 
feat given that any options for reform are made more challenging by a number of 
constraints in the form of the UK’s pre-existing legislative framework, current EU 
obligations and the FATF standards. This article examined two central aspects of 
the regime, although it should be noted that the Consultation Paper considers other 
important features such as improved information sharing and corporate criminal 
liability. 
It is to be hoped that, notwithstanding the proposed retention of an “all-crimes” 
approach to AML, a number of carve outs from the scope of reporting in respect 
of those SARs of limited or no utility may still effectively streamline the regime. 
Whilst proposals to raise the suspicion thresholds for authorised and required 
disclosures are conceptually appealing as they shift the point at which criminal 
liability bites for reporters in the regulated sector, this may present operational 
challenges for reporters and may even prompt more of a compliance focus rather 
than a risk-based approach to AML should an over-reliance on statutory guidance 
on reasonable grounds emerge across the sectors. Raising the threshold with regard 
to required disclosures also gives rise to compliance issues both at EU and FATF 
level. Perhaps it is worth concluding with the following observation—ultimately, 
any refinement of the prevention pillar of AM/CTF must be accompanied by 
meaningful enforcement in order to create a comprehensive regime. 
